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Abstract
This paper investigates optimal capital taxation in an innovation-driven growth
model. We examine how the optimal capital tax rate varies with externalities associated
with R&D and innovation. Our results show that the optimal capital tax rate is higher
when (i) the stepping on toes e¤ect is smaller, (ii) the standing on shoulders e¤ect
is stronger, or (iii) the extent of creative destruction is greater. Moreover, the optimal
capital tax rate and the monopolistic markup exhibit an inverted-U relationship. By
calibrating our model to the US economy, we nd that the optimal capital tax rate is
positive, at a rate of around 11.9 percent. We also nd that a positive optimal capital
tax rate is more likely to be the case when there is underinvestment in R&D.
Keywords: Optimal capital taxation, R&D externalities, innovation
JEL classication: E62, H21, O31
1 Introduction
Capital income is taxed worldwide. The estimated e¤ective average tax rates on capital
income are around 40% in the United States and 30% in EU countries. In some countries,
such as the United Kingdom and Japan, the capital income tax rates are even up to nearly
60%. From the perspective of welfare maximization, whether these capital tax rates are too
high or too low is an important policy question.
Despite the fact that capital taxes are commonly levied in the real world, a striking theory
put forth by Judd (1985) and Chamley (1986) suggests that the government should only tax
labor income and leave capital income untaxed in the long run. A number of subsequent
studies, including Chari et al. (1994), Jones et al. (1997), Atkeson et al. (1999), and Chari
and Kehoe (1999), relax key assumptions in Judd (1985) and Chamley (1986), and nd their
result to be quite robust. The idea of a zero optimal capital tax has then been dubbed the
Chamley-Judd result, which turns out to be one of the most well-established and important
results in the optimal taxation literature.1
In this paper, we revisit the Chamley-Judd result in an innovation-driven growth model.
There are several reasons as to why we choose this environment to study optimal taxation.
First, as stressed by Aghion et al. (2013), it appears that the consideration of growth does
not play much of a role in the debate on the Chamley-Judd result. However, given that the
recent empirical evidence suggests that the tax structure has a signicant impact on economic
growth (e.g., Arnold et al., 2011), it is more plausible to bring the role of growth into the
picture. Second, along the line of the optimal taxation literature, production technology
is treated as exogenously given. The role of endogenous technological change driven by
R&D has thus been neglected in previous models. In view of the fact that innovation is
a crucial factor in economic development as well as in the improvement of human well-
being, overlooking this element could lead to a suboptimal design of tax policies. Our study
thus aims to ll this gap. Third, as pointed out by Domeij (2005), a key premise in early
contributions supporting the Chamley-Judd result is that there exist no inherent distortions
and externalities in the economy. If market failures are present, the optimal capital income
tax might be di¤erent from zero. Thus, we introduce an innovation market that featues
various R&D externalities put forth by Jones and Williams (2000). Within this framework,
we can study how the optimal capital taxation and R&D externalities interact in ways not
1More recently, Chari et al. (2020) further support the result that capital should not be taxed by extending
the model to include richer tax instruments that the government can access.
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so far understood.
By calibrating the model to the US economy, our numerical analysis shows that the opti-
mal capital income tax rate is around 12 percent. The reason for a positive optimal capital
income tax in our R&D-based growth model can be briey explained as follows. In essence,
the Chamley-Judd result involves a tax shift between capital income tax and labor income
tax. The basic rationale behind a zero optimal capital tax is that taxing capital generates
more distortion than taxing labor, because taxing capital creates a dynamic ine¢ciency for
capital accumulation. In our R&D-based growth model, by contrast, innovation requires
R&D labor, as typically specied in standard R&D-based growth models (e.g., Romer, 1990;
Jones, 1995; Acemoglu, 1998).2 Under such a framework, taxing labor has a detrimental
e¤ect on the incentives for innovation and growth. This introduces a justication for taxing
capital income instead of labor income. On these grounds, it might be optimal to have a
non-zero capital income tax rate.
Although the result of a positive capital income tax rate is not new in the literature, our
study provides insights by examining with what features of the innovation process would the
optimal capital tax rate be positive. By varying the parameters capturing important R&D
externalities to see how the optimal capital income tax responds, our analysis reveals the
following ndings. First, under the benchmark parameters, the optimal capital tax rate is
positive, but this result can be sensitive to the parameter that determines the monopolistic
markup. Second, when knowledge spillovers are large or R&D duplication externalities are
small (thereby increasing the chances of underinvestment in R&D), it is more likely that
a positive optimal capital income tax rate will result. Third, when creative destruction is
more important in the R&D process, the optimal capital income tax rate should be higher
(lower) if the monopolistic markup is constrained (unconstrained) by the degree of creative
destruction. Fourth, a higher government spending ratio pushes toward a positive optimal
capital income tax.
Another contribution of this paper is that we identify the role of the monopolistic markup
played in determining optimal capital taxation. Our numerical analysis shows that the op-
timal capital income tax and the markup display an inverted-U shaped relationship. In
2There are two specications regarding the innovation process in typical R&D-based growth models: the
knowledge-driven specication (i.e., R&D using labor/scientists as inputs) and the lab-equipment speci-
cation (i.e., R&D using nal goods as inputs). Our analysis adopts the former approach by following the
viewpoint of Romer (1990) and Jones (1995) and also the empirical viewpoint of Einiö (2014) who points out
that R&D is a labor-intensive activity. If we instead adopt the lab-equipment specication, the numerical
values of the optimal capital tax rate would be di¤erent. However, the nature of the relationships between
R&D externalities and the optimal capital tax, which is our central goal in this paper, will not change.
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existing studies, a well-known result is that when the intermediate rms are imperfectly
competitive, capital investment is too low compared to the socially optimal level (e.g., Aiya-
gari, 1995; Judd, 1997, 2002; Coto-Martínez et al., 2007). Accordingly, the government
should subsidize capital income to induce a higher level of capital investment, implying that
the optimal capital income tax tends to decrease when the monopolistic markup increases.
In addition to capturing this traditional e¤ect, our present R&D-based growth model also
discloses another e¤ect. In our model, the markup is inversely determined by the elasticity
of substitution between intermediate goods. A reduction in the substitution elasticity that
raises the markup amplies the productivity of di¤erentiated varieties in the production of
nal goods and hence increases the social value of R&D. As a result of this, the government
is inclined to subsidize labor by taxing capital given that the R&D sector uses labor. In
consideration of this R&D e¤ect, an increase in the monopolistic markup is not necessarily
accompanied by a lower optimal capital income tax.
There is a vast literature that attempts to overturn the Chamley-Judd result.3 Two
papers studying the optimal factor tax within the framework of an innovation-based endoge-
nous growth model are closely related to our present paper. Aghion et al. (2013) is the rst
attempt that introduces R&D-based growth into the debate of the Chamley-Judd result.
They nd that a positive optimal capital income tax can be the case when the government-
spending-to-output ratio exceeds 38%, which is much larger than the empirical value. In
our analysis, by contrast, the optimal capital income tax is positive even if the government
spending ratio is quite small (around 14%). Long and Pelloni (2017) also nd a sizable
positive optimal capital tax by using a standard expanding-variety R&D model a la Romer
(1990). In contrast to previous literature on the Chamley-Judd result, in Long and Pelloni
(2017) the role of physical capital is dismissed and the capital tax is imposed on the return
of nancial assets related to R&D investment.
In sum, our paper contributes to the above studies in the following ways. First, by
following the specication of Jones and Williams (2000), our model is free of the scale
e¤ect which is often not observed in reality (Jones, 1995).4 Second, our model features R&D
3The majority of this literature obtains a positive optimal capital income tax; see, e.g., Chamley (2001),
Erosa and Gervais (2002), Cozzi (2004), Domeij (2005), Golosov et al. (2006), Conesa et al. (2009), Aghion
et al. (2013), Chen and Lu (2013), Piketty and Saez (2013), Long and Pelloni (2017), and Straub and
Werning (2020). Alternatively, a few studies overturn the Chamley-Judd result by proposing a negative
optimal capital tax; see, e.g., Judd (1997, 2002), Coto-Martínez et al. (2007), and Petrucci (2015).
4The earlier R&D-based growth models (Romer, 1990; Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Aghion and Howitt,
1992) have a feature that changes in the size of an economys population a¤ect the long-run growth rate.
Jones (1995) argues that such a scale e¤ect is not supported by empirical evidence.
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externalities in various dimensions, which ts our goal to examine the relation between the
optimal capital income tax and the innovation process. In particular, our analysis examines
how the optimal capital tax rate changes with the monopolistic markup. These are important
issues that are not fully investigated in previous studies.
Our paper is also related to a group of studies that examine the e¤ects of factor taxes in
R&D-based growth models. Zeng and Zhang (2002) examine the long-run growth e¤ects of
various taxes including the capital, labor, and consumption tax. Scrimgeour (2015) examines
the e¤ects of reforming taxes on government revenues and welfare. Iwaisako (2016) explores
the e¤ects of patent protection on optimal corporate income and consumption taxes. These
papers, however, do not focus on the normative analysis of optimal capital taxation.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we describe the R&D-based growth
model featuring creative destruction and various types of R&D externalities elucidated by
Jones and Williams (2000). In Section 3 we analyze how capital tax changes a¤ect the
economy in the long run. In Section 4 we quantify the optimal capital income tax rate and
examine how its value depends on various R&D externalities. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
Our framework builds on the scale-invariant R&D-based growth model in Jones andWilliams
(2000). The main novelty of the Jones-Williams model is that it introduces a variety of
R&D externalities into the original variety-expanding R&D-based growth model in Romer
(1990). In this paper, we extend their model by incorporating (i) an elastic labor supply
and (ii) factor income taxes, namely, capital and labor income taxes. To conserve space, the
familiar components of the Romer variety-expanding model will be briey described, while
new features will be described in more detail.
2.1 Households
We consider a continuous-time economy that is inhabited by a representative household. At
time t, the population size of the household is Nt, which grows at an exogenous rate n. Each
member of the household is endowed with one unit of time that can be used to supply labor
to a competitive market or enjoy leisure. The lifetime utility function of the representative
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household is given as:5
U =
Z 1
0
e t [ln ct +  ln(1  lt)] dt;  > 0;   0; (1)
where ct is per capita consumption and lt is the supply of labor per capita. The parameters
 and  denote, respectively, the subjective rate of time preference and leisure preference.
The representative household maximizes (1) subject to the following budget constraint:
_kt + _et = [(1  K)rK;t   n  ]kt + (re;t   n) et + (1  L;t)wtlt   ct; (2)
where a dot hereafter denotes the derivative with respect to time, kt is physical capital per
capita,  is the physical capital depreciation rate, et is the value of equity shares of R&D
owned by each member, rK;t is the capital rental rate, re;t is the rate of dividend, and wt
is the wage rate. The policy parameters K and L;t are respectively the capital and labor
income tax rate.6
Solving the dynamic optimization problem yields the following rst-order conditions:
1
ct
= qt; (3)
(1  L;t)wt(1  lt) = ct; (4)
re;t = (1  K)rK;t   : (5)
where qt is the Hamiltonian co-state variable on eq. (2). Equations (3) and (4) are re-
spectively the optimality conditions for consumption and labor supply, and eq. (5) is a
no-arbitrage condition which states that the net returns on physical capital and equity
shares must be equalized. We denote the common net return on both assets as rt (i.e.,
rt = re;t = (1  K)rK;t   ). The typical Keynes-Ramsey rule is:
_ct
ct
= rt   n  : (6)
5Here we assume that household welfare depends on per capita utility. See, e.g., Chu and Cozzi (2014)
for a similar specication.
6We drop the subscript t for K because it is treated as an exogenous policy parameter throughout the
paper.
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2.2 The nal-goods sector
A perfectly-competitive nal-good sector produces a single nal output Yt (treated as the
numéraire) by using labor and a continuum of intermediate capital goods, according to the
CES technology:
Yt = L
1 
Y;t
 
AtX
i=1
xt (i)
! 1

; 1 >  > 0; 1= >  > 0; (7)
where LY;t is the labor input employed in nal goods production, xt(i) is the i-th intermediate
capital good, and At is the number of varieties of the intermediate goods.
Prot maximization yields the following conditional demand functions for the labor input
and intermediate goods:
wt = (1  )
Yt
LY;t
; (8)
pt(i) = L
1 
Y;t
 
AtX
i=1
xt (i)
! 1

 1
x 1t (i); (9)
where pt(i) is the price of the i-th intermediate good.
2.3 The intermediate-goods sector
Each intermediate good is produced by a monopolistic producer that owns a perpetually
protected patent for that good. The producer uses one unit of physical capital to produce
one unit of intermediate goods; that is, the production function is xt(i) = vt(i), where vt(i)
denotes the capital input employed by monopolistic intermediate rm i. Accordingly, the
prot of intermediate goods rm i is:
x;t(i) = pt(i)xt(i)  rK;tvt(i): (10)
Let t(i) denote the gross markup that the i-th intermediate rm can charge over its
marginal cost; that is:
pt(i) = t(i)rK;t: (11)
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Then, the prot of the i-th intermediate rm can be obtained as:
x;t(i) =
t(i)  1
t(i)

Yt
At
: (12)
In subsection 2.5, we will elucidate how t(i) is determined.
2.4 The R&D sector
R&D creates new varieties of intermediate goods for nal-good production. The production
technology we adopt incorporates the knowledge-driven specication of Romer (1990) and
Jones (1995), i.e., innovation using the labor input (scientists and engineers), with the Jones
and Williams (2000)s specication which features fruitful R&D externalities:
(1 +  ) _At = ~& tLA;t;   0; (13)
where LA;t is the labor input used in the R&D sector, and ~& t is the productivity of R&D
which the innovators take as given. The parameter  represents the size of the innovation
clusters.7
We follow Jones (1995) to specify that the productivity of R&D takes the following
functional form:
~& t = &L
 1
A;t A

t ; & > 0; 1   > 0; 1 >  > 0; (14)
where & is a constant productivity parameter. In addition to &, eqs. (13) and (14) contain
three parameters ,  and  . These parameters capture salient features of the R&D process,
as proposed by Jones and Williams (1998).
First, the parameter 1   > 0 reects a (negative) duplication externality or a congestion
e¤ect of R&D. It implies that the social marginal product of research labor can be less than
the private marginal product. This may happen because of, for example, a patent race, or
if two researchers accidentally work out a similar idea. Jones and Williams (1998) refer to
this negative duplication externality as the stepping on toes e¤ect. Notice that this e¤ect is
stronger with a smaller , and it vanishes when  = 1.
Second, the parameter 1 >  > 0 reects a (positive) knowledge spillover e¤ect due to
the fact that richer existing ideas are helpful to the development of new ideas. A higher 
means that the spillover e¤ect is greater. In his pioneering article, Romer (1990) species
7In the later analysis, we will provide a more detailed explanation for this parameter.
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 = 1; however, Jones (1995) argues that  = 1 exhibits a scale e¤ect which is inconsistent
with the empirical evidence. We follow Jones (1995) and assume that  < 1 in order to
remove this scale e¤ect. The knowledge spillover e¤ect is dubbed by Jones and Williams
(1998) as the standing on shoulders e¤ect.
Finally, the parameter   0 denotes the size of the innovation clusters, which captures
the concept of creative destruction formalized in the Schumpeterian growth model developed
by Aghion and Howitt (1992). The basic idea is that innovations must come together in
clusters, some of which are new, while others simply build on old fashions. More specically,
suppose that an innovation cluster, which contains (1+ ) varieties, has been invented. Out
of these (1+ ) varieties, only one unit of variety is entirely new and thus increases the mass
of the variety of intermediate goods. The remaining portion, of size  , simply replaces the
old versions. This portion captures the spirit of creative destruction since new versions are
created with the elimination of old versions. However this part does not contribute to an
increase in existing varieties. In other words, for (1 +  ) intermediate goods invented, the
actual augmented variety is 1, while there are  repackaged varieties.
Given ~& t, the R&D sector hires LA;t to create (1 + ) varieties. Thus, the prot function
is A;t = PA;t(1 +  ) _At  wtLA;t. By assuming free entry in the R&D sector, we can obtain:
PA;t =
st
1  st
(1  )Yt
(1 +  ) _At
; (15)
where st  LA;t=Lt is the ratio of research labor to total labor supply Lt. Moreover, the
no-arbitrage condition for the value of a variety is:
rtPA;t = x;t + _PA;t    
_At
At
PA;t: (16)
In the absence of creative destruction ( = 0), the familiar no-arbitrage condition reports
that, for each variety, the return on the equity shares rtPA;t will be equal to the sum of
the ow of the monopolistic prot x;t plus the capital gain or loss _PA;t. When creative
destruction is present, existing goods are replaced. Accompanied by _At new varieties being
invented, the amount of  _At existing varieties will be replaced. Therefore, for each variety,
the expected probability of being replaced is  _At=At, which gives rise to the expected capital
loss expressed by the last term in eq. (16).
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2.5 The monopolistic markup
This subsection explains how the monopolistic markup t(i) is determined. As identied by
Jones and Williams (2000), there are two scenarios in which the markup is decided. The
rst is the unconstrained case. In this case, the monopolistic intermediate rm freely sets
the price by maximizing eq. (10) subject to the production function xt(i) = vt(i) and eq.
(9), which yields the pricing rule pt(i) =
1

rK;t. We refer to
1

as the unconstrained
markup. The second case is the constrained case, which may occur if the new designs are
linked together in the innovation cluster. Specically, a larger size of innovation clusters  
serves as a constraint that controls the magnitude of the monopolistic markup. The intuition
underlying this idea requires a more detailed explanation. Consider that the current number
of varieties is At. Now an innovation cluster with size (1+ ) is developed. This increases the
mass of varieties to At+1; at the same time it also replaces old-version varieties by  units.
Subsequently, the nal-good rm faces two choices. It can either adopt the new innovation
cluster and then use At+1 intermediate goods priced at a markup, or part with the new
innovation cluster and still use At intermediate goods in the production process. If the nal-
good rm chooses the latter, since  varieties have now been displaced, the nal-good rm
only needs to purchase At  units of intermediate goods at a markup price, while the other
 units of displaced intermediate goods can be purchased at a lower (competitive) price.
When the size of an innovation cluster is high (a large value of  ), the nal-good rm will
not tend to adopt the new innovation cluster because sticking to old clusters is cheaper. As
a result, the intermediate-good rms have to set a lower price so as to attract the nal-good
rm to adopt the new innovation cluster. This adoption constraint explains why an increase
in the size of the innovation clusters reduces the markup.
In an appendix, Jones and Williams (2000) demonstrate that the constrained markup
is negatively related to both the size of the innovation clusters and the elasticity of substi-
tution between capital goods. Specically, they demonstrate that, in order to attract the
nal-good rm to adopt the new innovation cluster, the intermediate-good rms cannot set
a markup that is higher than [(1 + )= ]1= 1. A prot-maximizing rm thus always tends
to set the highest price pt(i) = [(1 +  )= ]
1= 1rK;t. We refer to [(1 +  )= ]
1= 1 as the
"unconstrained" markup. By combining the constrained markup pricing with the uncon-
strained markup pricing rule mentioned earlier (i.e., pt(i) =
1

rK;t), we can conclude that
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the equilibrium markup is:
t(i) = min
(
1

;

1 +  
 
 1

 1
)
; (17)
which is independent of i and t. Combining eqs. (10) and (17) implies that all intermediate-
good rms are symmetric. Hence, the notation i can be dropped from now on.
2.6 The government and aggregation
The government collects capital income taxes and labor income taxes to nance its public
spending. The balanced budget constraint faced by the government is:
Nt(KrK;tkt + L;twtlt) = Gt; (18)
where Gt is the total government spending. We assume that government spending is a xed
proportion of nal output, i.e., Gt = Yt, where  2 (0; 1) is the ratio of government spending
to output. As in Conesa et al. (2009), Aghion et al. (2013) and Long and Pelloni (2017),
equation (18) puts aside the role of government debt when examining the optimal factor
taxes. That is, we mainly focus on the trade-o¤ between the capital and labor income tax.8
Now let us dene the aggregate capital stock as Kt = Ntkt, aggregate consumption
Ct = Ntct, and total labor supply Lt = Ntlt. After some derivations, we can obtain the
following resource constraint in the economy: _Kt = Yt   Ct  Gt   Kt.
2.7 The decentralized equilibrium
The decentralized equilibrium in this economy is an innite sequence of allocations {Ct; Kt;
At, Yt; Lt; LY;t; LA;t; xt; vt}
1
t=0, prices fw t; rK;t; rt; pt; PA;tg
1
t=0, and policies fK ; L;tg, such
that at each instant of time:
a. households choose fct; kt; et; ltg to maximize lifetime utility, eq. (1), taking prices and
policies as given;
b. competitive nal-good rms choose fxt; LY;tg to maximize prot taking prices as given;
8We do not consider time-variant tax rates as done by Chamley (1985). Introducing time-variant tax
rates would be interesting, but also brings substantial technical complexity. Moreover, Aghion et al. (2013)
point out that time-dependent policies are not empirically relevant.
c. monopolistic intermediate rms i 2 [0; At] choose fvt; ptg to maximize prot taking
rK;t as given;
d. the R&D sector chooses LA;t to maximize prot taking fPA;t; wtg and the productivity
~& t as given;
e. the labor market clears, i.e., Ntlt = LA;t + LY;t;
f. the capital market clears, i.e., Ntkt = Atvt;
g. the stock market for variety clears, i.e., Ntet = PA;tAt
h. the resource constraint is satised, i.e., _Kt = Yt   Ct  Gt   Kt;
i. the government budget constraint is balanced, i.e., Nt(KrK;tkt + L;twtlt) = Gt.
3 Balanced growth path
In this section, we explore the balanced growth path along which each variable grows at a
constant rate, which can be zero. We denote the growth rate of any generic variable Z by
gZ , and drop the time subscript to denote any variable in a steady state. The steady-state
growth rates of varieties and output are given by (see Appendix A):
gA =

1  
n; gY =
1
1  

1

  

gA + n: (19a)
Moreover, in order to obtain stationary endogenous variables, it is necessary to dene the
following transformed variables:
k^t 
Kt
Nt
; c^t 
Ct
Nt
; y^t 
Yt
Nt
; a^t 
At
N
=(1 )
t
; (19b)
where   1 + (1= )
(1 )(1 )
> 0 is a composite parameter. For ease of exposition, in line with
Eicher and Turnovsky (2001), k^, c^, y^, and a^ are dubbed the scale-adjusted capital, consump-
tion, output, and R&D varieties, respectively. Based on the transformed variables and the
equilibrium dened in subsection 2.5, the economy in the steady state can be described by
the following set of equations:
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r = (1  K)rK    =  + gY ; (20a)
s =
 1


1 
(1+ )gA
r   gY +

1 +  1


1 

(1+ )gA
; (20b)
k^
y^
=

rK
; (20c)
(1  )
y^
k^
=
c^
k^
+ gY + ; (20d)
y^ = a^1= k^ ((1  s)l)1  ; (20e)
gA =
1
1 +  
& (sl)
a^1 
; (20f)
l
(1  l)
=
(1  L)(1  )
(1  s)
y^
c^
; (20g)
L =
1  s
1  

   K



; (20h)
in which eight endogenous variables r, s, c^, k^, a^, y^, l, L are determined.
Of particular note, our main focus is on the examination of the capital tax. By holding
the proportion of the government spending constant, an increase in the capital income tax
will be coupled with a reduction in the labor income tax. Therefore, the literature on the
Chamley-Judd result generally assumes that the labor income tax endogenously adjusts to
balance the government budget. This approach has been dubbed as tax shifting or tax
swap in the literature. Our analysis follows this standard approach in the literature.
3.1 Comparative static analysis
In this section, we analyze the e¤ects of capital taxation on the R&D share s of labor, the
endogenous labor income tax rate, labor supply, and other scale-adjusted variables: a^; k^; c^;
and y^.9
The long-run R&D labor share, s, is given by
9We solve the dynamic system in Appendix B, and a detailed derivation of the comparative static analysis
is presented in Appendix C.
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s =
 1


1 
(1+ )gA
r   gY +

1 +  1


1 

(1+ )gA
: (21a)
It follows from the above equation that, in the steady state, a change in the capital income tax
rate (21a) does not a¤ect the R&D labor share (i.e., @s=@K = 0). The intuition underlying
@s=@K = 0 can be grasped as follows. The non-arbitrage condition between physical capital
and R&D equity reported in (20a) requires that the return on physical capital be equal to the
return on R&D equity. Given that the return on R&D equity, r = + 1
1 

1

  

gA + n,
is independent of the capital tax rate, the capital income tax rate does not a¤ect the return
on R&D equity and the R&D labor share. Therefore, our analysis does not rely on capital
taxation having a direct e¤ect on the allocation of R&D and production labor. Instead,
our analysis is based on the trade-o¤ between labor supply and capital investment as in the
standard Chamley-Judd setting.
From (20h), we have:
L =
1  s
1  

   K



; (21b)
Based on (21a), we have:
@L
@K
=  
1  s


1  
< 0: (21c)
The above equation shows that an increase in the capital income tax rate is coupled with a
reduction in the labor income tax rate.
Given a constant capital income tax rate K , labor supply in the steady state is given
by:
l = 1 

+ 1
[(1 ) (+gY )
(1 K )
(++gY )
]
(1 L)(1 )
(1 s)
. (22a)
It is straightforward from eq.(22a) to infer the following result:
@l
@K
=
( 1 s
1 
)[1   +  1

(+gY )
+(1+ )gA
](1  l)l
( +  + gY )(1  L)[1     ( + gY )
(1 K)
(++gY )
]
> 0. (22b)
Equation (22b) indicates that, when taxes shift from a labor income tax to a capital
income tax, a rise in the capital income tax rate leads to an increase in labor supply. The
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intuition underlying this result can be explained as follows. In response to a rise in the
capital income tax rate, the following e¤ect emerges. Raising the capital tax rate reduces
the labor income tax rate (see eq. (21b)) and raises the after-tax wage income, thereby
exerting a positive e¤ect on labor supply. Therefore, a rise in the capital income tax rate is
accompanied by an increase in labor supply.
Moreover, the scale-adjusted R&D varieties a^ is given by:
a^ =

&
(1 +  )gA
1=(1 )
(sl)=(1 ); (23a)
where s and l are reported in eqs. (21a) and (22a). With @s=@K = 0, it is quite easy from
eq. (23a) to derive that:
@a^
@K
=
a^
(1  )l
@l
@K
> 0: (23b)
Equation (23b) indicates that a rise in the capital income tax rate boosts scale-adjusted
R&D varieties. The intuition is clear. Following a rise in the capital income tax rate that is
coupled with a decline in the labor income tax rate, the household is motivated to increase
its labor supply. This in turn increases labor input allocated to the R&D sector (LA = Nsl).
Then, as reported in eq. (23a), given that scale-adjusted R&D varieties a^ is increasing in
the R&D labor input sNl, a^ will increase in response to a rise in K .
From eqs. (20a), (20c), (20d), (23a), and (20e), we can infer that:
y^ =

&
(1 +  )gA
 1= 
(1 )(1 )
(sl)
1= 
1 

1 

(1  K)
( +  + gY )
 
1 
(1  s)l; (24a)
where
@y^
@K
=

 

(1  )(1  K)
+

l
@l
@K

y^
>
<
0: (24b)
Equation (24b) indicates that a rise in the capital income tax rate has ambiguous e¤ects on
the scale-adjusted output y^. As shown in eq. (24b), two conicting e¤ects emerge following
a rise in the capital income tax rate. First, a rise in the capital income tax rate shrinks
capital investment, which in turn generates a negative impact on output. Second, a rise in
the capital income tax rate is accompanied by a fall in the labor income tax rate, which
motivates the household to provide more labor supply. This increase in labor supply implies
that more labor input is available for the R&D sector and in turn boosts R&D varieties,
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thereby contributing to a positive e¤ect on output. If labor supply is exogenous ( = 0), the
second positive e¤ect is absent (@l=@K = 0), and a higher capital income tax rate lowers
output. However, if labor supply is endogenous ( > 0), the two opposing e¤ects are present,
and the output e¤ect of capital income taxation depends upon the relative strength between
these two e¤ects.
From eqs. (20a), (20c), and (20d), we have:
k^ =
(1  K)
( + gY )
y^; (25a)
c^ = [(1  )  (1  K)]y^; (25b)
where   (+gY )
(++gY )
is a composite parameter. Based on eqs. (25a) and (25b), the e¤ects
of K on k^ and c^ can be expressed as:
@k^
@K
=  

( + gY )
y^ +
(1  K)
( + gY )
y^
@K
(26a)
= [
@l
l@K
 
1
(1  )(1  K)
]
(1  K)
( + gY )
y^
>
<
0;
@c^
@K
= y^ + [(1  )  (1  K)]
@y^
@K
(26b)
= f + [(1  )  (1  K)][
@l
l@K
 

(1  )(1  K)
]gy^
>
<
0:
The intuition behind eqs. (26a) and (26b) can be explained as follows. It is clear in
eq. (25a) that capital income taxation a¤ects scale-adjusted capital k^ through two channels.
The rst channel is the capital-output ratio k^=y^ = (1 K)
(+gY )
, and the second channel is the
level of scale-adjusted output y^. The rst term after the rst equality in eq. (26a) indicates
that the rst channel denitely lowers the level of k^. Moreover, as shown in eq. (24b),
the second channel may either raise or lower the level of k^ since capital taxation leads to
an ambiguous e¤ect on y^. As a consequence, the net e¤ect of capital taxation on the scale-
adjusted capital stock k^ is still uncertain. Similarly, as indicated in eq. (25b), capital income
taxation also a¤ects c^ through two channels. The rst channel is the consumption-output
ratio c^=y^ = [(1 )  (1 K)], and the second channel is the level of scale-adjusted output
y^. The rst channel denitely boosts the level of c^, while the second channel may either
raise or lower the level of c^ since capital taxation leads to an ambiguous e¤ect on y^. As
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a consequence, the net e¤ect of capital taxation on scale-adjusted consumption c^ remains
ambiguous.
4 Quantitative results
In this section, we simulate the transitional dynamic e¤ects of capital taxation and compute
the optimal capital tax rate by performing a quantitative analysis.10 We calibrate the para-
meters of our theoretical model based on US data to quantify the optimal capital tax. Then
we explore how the optimal capital tax responds to important parameters that feature R&D
externalities and the government size.11
By dropping the exogenous terms, the life-time utility of the representative household
reported in eq. (1) can be expressed as:
U =
Z 1
0
e t [ln c^t +  ln(1  lt)] dt; (27)
in which c^t and lt are functions of K . The government chooses the capital income tax rate
K to maximize eq. (27) that includes the transitional dynamics, while balancing the budget,
eq. (18), using the labor tax.12
4.1 Calibration
To carry out a numerical analysis, we rst choose a baseline parameterization, as reported
in Table 1. Our model has eleven parameter values to be assigned. These parameters are
either set to a commonly used value in the existing literature or calibrated to match some
empirical moments in the US economy. We now describe each of them in detail. In line with
Andolfatto et al. (2008) and Chu and Cozzi (2018), the labor income share 1    and the
discount rate  are set to standard values 0.4 and 0.05, respectively. The population growth
rate n is set to 0.011 as used by Conesa et al. (2009). The physical capital depreciation rate
is set to 0.0318 so that the initial capital-output ratio is 2.5 as in Lucas (1990). The initial
capital tax rate K is set to 0.3 based on the average US e¤ective tax rate estimated by Carey
and Tchilingurian (2000). A similar value of the capital income tax rate has been adopted in
10We describe the dynamic system of the model in Appendix B.
11We start from the same initial steady state when we vary the value of each parameter.
12The numerical approach is basically consistent with Aghion et al. (2013), except that their initial capital
income tax rate is set to 0%, while we consider a value of 30% to t the US data.
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Domeij (2005) and Chen and Lu (2013). As for the government size (the ratio of government
spending to output), data for the US indicate that this is around 20 percent (Gali, 1994),
and has slightly increased in recent years. We therefore set  to be 0.22, which is the average
level during 2001-2013, to reect its increasing trend. The parameter for leisure preference
 is chosen as 1.5901 to make hours worked around one third of total hours.
Table 1. Benchmark Parameterization
Denition Parameter Value Source/Target
Labor income share 1   0.6 Andolfatto et al. (2008)
Discount rate  0.05 Chu and Cozzi (2018)
Population growth rate n 0.011 Conesa et al. (2009)
Initial capital tax rate K 0.3 Carey and Tchilingurian (2000)
Government size  0.22 Data
Leisure preference  1.5901 Total hours worked = 1/3
R&D productivity & 1 Normalized13
Standing on toes e¤ect  0.5 Benchmark
Substitution parameter  2.2727 Monopolistic markup = 1.1
Standing on shoulders e¤ect  0.9593 Output growth rate = 2%
Size of innovation cluster  0.25 Comin (2004)
Physical capital depreciation rate  0.0318 Capital-output ratio = 2.5
Our parameterization regarding the R&D process basically follows the approach in Jones
and Williams (2000). First, we normalize the R&D productivity & to unity. The value of
the parameter for the standing on toes e¤ect  is somewhat di¢cult to calibrate because, as
argued by Stokey (1995), the empirical literature does not provide much guidance on such a
parameter. In our analysis, we thus choose an intermediate value  = 0:5 as a benchmark,
but we will allow it to vary over the whole interval from 0 to 0.564.14 The substitution
parameter  is closely related to the markup of the intermediate rms. We set  to be
2.2727 such that, given 1  , the (unconstrained) markup in our economy is 1.1, which lies
within the reasonable range estimated for US industries (e.g., Laitner and Stolyarov, 2004;
Yang, 2018). Next, we use the output growth rate to calibrate the extent of the standing on
13Our results are independent of the value of &.
14If the value of  is over 0.564, the second-order condition of the governments maximization with respect
to K will not be satised.
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shoulders e¤ect . In our model we have:
gY =
1
1  

1

  

gA + n: (28)
Given that gA = n=(1  ) and that we have already assigned values to 1  , , n and ,
we can then choose  to target the empirical level of the output growth rate in the US, which
is around 2%. This results in  = 0:9593 as our baseline value. Finally, as a benchmark we
choose the size of the innovation cluster  = 0:25 by following Comin (2004). In this case
the markup is not bound by the adoption constraint. If the value of  is large, the markup
will then be constrained and determined by this parameter. In subsection 4.3 we will run  
from 0 to 0.515 as a robustness check.
4.2 The optimal capital tax with transitional dynamics
Under our benchmark parameterization, Figure 1 plots the relationship between the level of
welfare and the rate of capital income tax, which exhibits an inverted-U shaped relationship.
Of particular note, the optimal capital tax is positive under our benchmark parameters, and
its value is around 11.9%. The Chamley-Judd result of zero capital tax does not hold in our
R&D-based growth model.
Figure 1: The level of welfare and the rate of capital income tax
The intuition underlying this result is as follows. Given that the government is limited to
capital and labor taxation to nance a x amount of the government expenditure, not taxing
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capital income implies that the labor income must be taxed at a higher rate. Although a
zero capital tax e¢ciently leaves the capital market undistorted, a high labor tax distorts
the labor market severely by decreasing the after-tax wage income and in turn reduces total
labor supply. As a consequence, there is less labor devoted to the production in the R&D
sector, which then results in fewer equilibrium varieties for the nal-good production, and
ultimately depresses the level of consumption and welfare.
Although Figure 1 suggests a positive optimal capital tax, we should note that this result
is obtained under our benchmark parameters, and it may change when the innovation process
exhibits di¤erent degrees of R&D externalities. Thus, our goal is not to conclude that it
is always right to tax capital, but to highlight that in achieving the social optimum, it is
necessary to balance both distortions in the capital and labor markets. In view of this, an
extreme case of the zero capital tax is often suboptimal. More importantly, we make an
attempt to give guidance on which R&D mechanisms are at play in inuencing the optimal
capital tax, which we will show in the next subsection.
4.3 Policy implications of R&D externalities
In this subsection, we investigate how the optimal capital tax responds to relevant parame-
ters, in particular those related to the innovation process. More importantly, we shed some
light on the roles of R&D externalities in the design of optimal tax policies. To this end, we
provide a robustness check for whether the positive optimal capital tax still survives under
various scenarios. In what follows, we propose some relevant parameters that need to be
considered by the policy-makers. The results are depicted in Figures 2 to 6. Our robustness
analysis generates several implications.
First, Figures 2 and 3 show that the optimal capital tax rate is increasing in  (the
stepping on toes e¤ect) and  (the standing on shoulders e¤ect). With su¢ciently small
values of  and , the optimal capital income tax is negative. Notice that a higher  implies
that the negative duplication externality is small, and a higher  means that the positive
spillover e¤ect of R&D is relatively strong. Both cases imply a similar circumstance in which
the innovation process is more productive, and in which underinvestment in R&D is more
likely. Under such a situation, the welfare cost of depressing innovation by raising the labor
income tax is larger. Therefore, the government is inclined to increase the capital tax while
reducing the labor tax.
Second, Figure 4 shows that the optimal capital income tax and the substitution para-
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Figure 2: The optimal capital tax rate and the stepping on toes e¤ect
Figure 3: The optimal capital tax rate and the standing on shoulders e¤ect
meter  exhibit an inverted-U shaped relationship. A lower  is associated with a higher
monopolistic markup , regardless of whether the adoption constraint is binding or not. The
substitution parameter mainly a¤ects the optimal capital tax in three di¤erent ways. First,
when  is large (when  is small), the degree of the intermediate rms monopoly power is
strong. To correct this distortion, the government tends to subsidize capital to o¤set the gaps
between price and the marginal cost; see Judd (1997, 2002). Second, when  is large (when
 is small), the private value of inventions increases. As a result, equilibrium R&D increases,
which in turn makes R&D overinvestment more likely. Therefore, the government tends to
raise the tax on labor because R&D uses labor in our model. These two e¤ects indicate that
the optimal capital tax should be decreasing in the markup as in previous studies. Third,
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a small  amplies the productivity of varieties in nal-good production and thus amplies
the e¤ect of gA on gY (see eq. (28)). In this case, the government is inclined to subsidize
labor by taxing capital since the R&D sector uses labor. This last e¤ect indicates that the
optimal capital tax rate is decreasing in the elasticity of substitution between intermediate
goods (or increasing in the markup). Figure 4 shows that the rst two e¤ects dominate
when  is small and the third e¤ect dominants when  becomes su¢ciently large. Thus the
optimal capital tax reverses as  exceeds a threshold value.
Figure 4: The optimal capital tax rate and the substitution parameter
Third, Figure 5 shows that the optimal capital tax increases in response to a rise in
the size of the innovation cluster (creative destruction). To explain the intuition, we rst
distinguish three e¤ects that creative destruction may have on the incentive to engage in
R&D. The rst positive e¤ect comes from the R&D rm being able to earn prots even for
those of its products that do not really increase the variety of intermediate goods (note that
A;t = PA;t(1 +  ) _At   wtLA;t).
15 This is referred to as the carrot by Jones and Williams
(2000). The second negative e¤ect arises, as exhibited in eq. (15), from a higher  that
decreases the equilibrium price of the products in the presence of free entry, even though it
increases the products sold by the R&D rm. The third negative e¤ect is associated with
the no-arbitrage condition for the value of a variety, which is displayed in eq. (16). Due
to creative destruction, existing goods have a probability of being replaced by new goods,
and this probability increases with the degree of creative destruction. Therefore, creative
destruction increases the expected capital loss in terms of the return on the equity shares,
15The R&D rm can earn prots from its whole products (1 +  ) _A, in which  _A does not contribute to
the increase of varieties.
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and in turn reduces the incentive to engage in R&D. Jones and Williams (2000) dub this
e¤ect as the stick. In the model, the rst and second e¤ects approximately o¤set each
other, leaving the stick e¤ect as the main inuence of creative destruction on R&D. As a
result, a higher  discourages R&D, and hence the government should increase the capital
tax and reduce the labor tax in order to boost labor supply and R&D labor.
Figure 5: The optimal capital tax rate and creative destruction
Finally, the optimal capital tax is increasing in the government spending ratio  (see
Figure 6). This result is consistent with Aghion et al. (2013) and Lu and Chen (2015).16
When the need for public expenditure is su¢ciently small, the government can collect labor
tax revenues to nance the government spending and also to subsidize capital. Note that in
this case the monopoly e¤ect dominates the R&D e¤ect so that the optimal capital tax rate
becomes negative. As the size of government expenditure increases, it is not promising to
rely solely on raising the labor tax, because the distortion to the R&D sector would be too
strong. In this case, it becomes optimal to shift some of the tax burden to capital.
As we have noted earlier, our result of a positive optimal capital income tax is obtained
under the benchmark parameters. Before ending this section, it is worthwhile to briey
discuss how plausible the above parameters fall into the range that implies a negative optimal
capital tax rate. First, the optimal capital tax rate becomes negative if  < 0:454, i.e., the
stepping on toes e¤ect is larger. This seems not very likely, however, as Jones and Williams
16Lu and Chen (2015) show that in an exogenous growth model with a given share of government expen-
diture in output, the optimal capital income tax is positive and increasing with the the share of government
expenditure. The intuition is that capital accumulation reduces the discounted net marginal product of next
periods capital by way of increasing government expenditure. Thus, the government should tax capital to
correct this distortion.
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Figure 6: The optimal capital tax and the government size
(2000) point out that the lower bound of  is about 0.5. Second, the optimal capital tax
rate becomes negative if the standing on shoulders e¤ect is smaller, i.e.,  < 0:948. For the
rst-generation R&D-based growth models a la Romer (1990),  = 1, so that our result of a
positive optimal capital income tax always holds. However, given that  can take a wide range
of values in the literature, it calls for further consideration on the positive optimal capital
tax before identifying the value of this parameter. Third, for the substitution parameter ,
the threshold value that will result in a negative optimal capital tax is  < 2:14. This implies
a monopolistic markup higher than 1.17. Fourth, the optimal capital tax rate is positive for
the whole possible values of the size of the innovation cluster  . Finally, the optimal capital
tax rate is negative if the government spending ratio is less than 13.8%, i.e.,  < 0:138. This
threshold value is much smaller than that in Aghion et al. (2013), in which the government
spending ratio required for a positive optimal capital tax rate is around 40%.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have examined whether the Chamley-Judd result of zero optimal capital
taxation is valid in a non-scale innovation-based growth model. By calibrating our model to
the US economy, our result shows that the optimal capital income tax is positive, at a rate
of around 11.9 percent. We examine how the optimal capital tax rate responds to various
R&D externalities. The optimal capital tax rate is higher when (i) the stepping on toes
e¤ect is smaller, (ii) the standing on shoulders e¤ect is stronger, or (iii) the extent of
creative destruction is greater. We also nd that the optimal capital tax is sensitive to the
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parameter that determines the monopolistic markup. An inverted-U relationship is found
between these two variables.
Some extensions for future research are worth noting. First, since R&D investment usu-
ally has liquidity problems (Lach, 2002), it would be relevant to introduce a credit constraint
on R&D investment into our model. Second, it would be interesting to examine the optimal
capital tax in an endogenous growth model where both innovation and capital accumula-
tion are the driving forces of economic growth (see, e.g., Iwaisako and Futagami, 2013; Chu
et al., 2019). These directions will no doubt generate new insights into the debate on the
Chamley-Judd result.
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Appendix A. Deriving the steady-state growth rate
To solve for the steady-state growth rate of the economy, from eqs. (13) and (14) we have:
_At
At
=
&
1 +  
LA;t
A1 t
: (A1)
where gA;t = _At=At: Let gZ denote gZ;t =
_Z
Z
the growth rate of any generic variable Z, and
drop the time subscript when referring to any variables in the steady state. The steady-state
growth rate of varieties is given by:
gA =
&
1 +  
LA
A1 
: (A2)
Moreover, the R&D labor share is st = LA;t=(Ntlt). In so doing, eq. (A2) can alternatively
be expressed as:
gA =
&
1 +  
(sNl)
A1 
: (A3)
By taking logarithms of eq. (A3) and di¤erentiating the resulting equation with respect to
time, we have the following steady-state expression:
gA =

1  
n: (A4)
Equipped with the symmetric feature x(i) = x, the equilibrium condition for the capital
market K = Av, and the production in the intermediate-good sector x = v, the aggregate
production function can be rewritten as:
Yt = A
1

 
t L

tK
1 
t : (A5)
Taking logarithms of eq. (A5) and di¤erentiating the resulting equation with respect to time,
we can infer the following result:
gY =
(1

  )
1  
gA + n: (A6)
Inserting eq. (A4) into eq. (A6) yields:
gY = n; (A7)
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where   1 +
( 1

 )
1 

1 
is a composite parameter.
We now turn to solve the steady-state R&D labor share. In the long run, substituting
_At = gAAt and di¤erentiating the resulting equation with respect to time gives rise to:
_PA=PA = gY   gA (A8)
From eqs. (12), (15), (17), in the steady state we have:
x =
   1


Y
A
(A9)
PA =
s
1  s
(1  )Y=A
(1 +  )gA
(A10)
r =
x
PA
+
_PA
PA
   gA (A11)
Substituting eqs. (A8), (A9), and (A10) into eq. (A11) yields the result:
r =
 1

Y=A
s
1 s
(1 )Y=A
(1+ )gA
+ gY   (1 +  )gA (A12)
Based on eq. (A12), we have the stationary R&D labor share s as follows:
s =
 1


1 
(1 +  )gA
r   gY + (1 +
 1


1 
)(1 +  )gA
(A13)
30
Appendix B. Transition dynamics
This appendix solves the dynamic system of the model under tax shifting from labor income
taxes to capital income taxes. The set of equations under the model is expressed by:
1
ct
= qt; (B1)
 = qt(1  L;t)wt(1  lt); (B2)
rt = (1  K)rK;t   ; (B3)
_ct
ct
= rt   n  ; (B4)
wt = (1  )
Yt
LY;t
; (B5)
rK;t = A
1

 1
t L
1 
Y;t x
 1
t ; (B6)
rK;tKt =


Yt; (B7)
x;t =
   1


Yt
At
; (B8)
rtPA;t = x;t + _PA;t    
_At
At
PA;t; (B9)
Gt = Yt; (B10)
Gt = Nt(KrK;tkt + L;twtlt); (B11)
Yt = A
1= 
t L
1 
Y;t K

t ; (B12)
_Kt = Yt   Ct  Gt   Kt; (B13)
_At
At
=
&
1 +  
LA;t
A1 t
; (B14)
PA;t =
st
1  st
(1  )Yt
(1 +  ) _At
; (B15)
Ntlt = LY;t + LA;t: (B16)
The above 16 equations determine 16 unknowns {ct, l t, At, K t, LY;t, x t, rK;t, x;t r t, Gt, L;t,
Y t, q t, LA;t, PA;t, w t}, where qt is the Hamiltonian multiplier, Ct = Ntct, Kt  Ntkt = Atxt,
and st= LA;t=N tlt. Based on Kt = Ntkt = Atxt, and eqs. (B1), (B2), (B5), and (B12), we
can obtain:
 =
1
ct
(1  L;t)(1  )
Yt
LY;t
(1  lt): (B17a)
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From eqs. (B5), (B7), and (B11), we have:
L;t = (1  st)
   

K
1  
: (B17b)
Moreover, to solve the balanced growth rate, we dene the following transformed variables:
k^t 
Kt
Nt
; c^t 
Ct
Nt
; y^t 
Yt
Nt
; a^t 
At
N
=(1 )
t
; st  LA;t=Ntlt: (B18)
Based on eqs. (B16), (B15), (B17a), and the above denitions, we can obtain:

(1  lt)
=
1
c^t
[1  (1  st)
   

K
1  
](1  )a^
1= 
t (k^t)
[1  st)lt]
 : (B19a)
From eq. (B19a), we can infer the following expression:
lt = lt(k^t; a^t; c^t; st; K); (B19b)
where
@lt
@k^t
=

k^t(
lt
1 lt
+ )
lt; (B20a)
@lt
@a^t
=
(1=  )
a^t(
lt
1 lt
+ )
lt; (B20b)
@lt
@c^t
=  
lt
c^t(
lt
1 lt
+ )
; (B20c)
@lt
@st
=
L;t
(1 L;t)
+ 
(1  st)(
lt
1 lt
+ )
lt; (B20d)
@lt
@K
=
(1  st)

(1 )
(1  L;t)(
lt
1 lt
+ )
lt: (B20e)
Based on (B3), (B4), (B7), (B12), (B18), and Ct = Ntct, we have:
gc^;t 
dc^t=dt
c^t
= (1  K)


(a^t)
1= [
(1  st)lt(k^t; a^t; c^t; st; K)
k^t
]1          gY : (B21)
From eqs. (B10), (B12), (B13), and (B18), we can directly infer:
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gk^;t 
dk^t=dt
k^t
= (1  )(a^t)
1= [
(1  st)lt(k^t; a^t; c^t; st; K)
k^t
]1   
c^t
k^t
     gY : (B22)
According to eqs. (B14) and (B18), we can further obtain:
ga^;t 
da^t=dt
a^t
=
&
1 +  
[stlt(k^t; a^t; c^t; st; K)]

a^1 t
  gA: (B23)
In what follows, to simplify the notation we suppress those arguments of the labor supply
function. From eq. (B18), taking logarithms of eqs. (B19a) and (B12) and di¤erentiating
the resulting equations with respect to time, we have:
gy^;t = (1=  )ga^;t + gk^;t + (1  )(
_lt=lt  
_st
1  st
); (B24)
_lt=lt = f(1=  )ga^;t + gk^;t   gc^;t   [ + L;t=(1  L;t)]g=[ + lt=(1  lt)]: (B25)
Taking logarithms of eq. (B15) di¤erentiating the resulting equation with respect to time,
we obtain:
_PA;t
PA;t
= (1=    )ga^;t + gk^;t + (1  + 
st
1  st
)
_st
st
+ (1    )
_lt
lt
+ gY   gA: (B26)
Combining eqs. (B9), (B15), (B18), (B21), (B24), (B25), and (B26) together, we obtain:
dst=dt
st
= f   [
(   1)(1 +  )(1  st)
(1  )st
   ](gA + ga^;t) + ga^;t + gA   [1 +
1    
 + lt=(1  lt)
]
[(1=  )ga^;t + gk^;t   gc^;t]g=f1  + 
st
1  st
+
1    
 + lt=(1  lt)
( +
L;t
1  L;t
)
st
1  st
g:
(B27)
Note that rt   gY   gc^;t = . As a result, in the steady state we have r   gY = :
Inserting eq. (B18) into eq. (B17b) yields:
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L;t = (1  st)
   

K
1  
: (B28)
Based on eqs. (B21), (B22), (B23),(B27), and (B28), the dynamic system can be ex-
pressed as:
dk^t=dt
k^t
= (1  )(a^t)
1= [
(1  st)lt
k^t
]1   
c^t
k^t
     gY ; (B29a)
da^t=dt
a^t
=
&
1 +  
(stlt)

a^1 t
  gA; (B29b)
dc^t=dt
c^t
= (1  K)


(a^t)
1= [
(1  st)lt
k^t
]1          gY ; (B29c)
dst=dt
st
= f   [
(   1)(1 +  )(1  st)
(1  )st
   ](gA + ga^;t) + ga^;t + gA   [1 +
1    
 + lt=(1  lt)
]
[(1=  )ga^;t + gk^;t   gc^;t]g=f1  + 
st
1  st
+
1    
 + lt=(1  lt)
( +
L;t
1  L;t
)
st
1  st
g:
(B29d)
Linearizing eqs. (B29a), (B29b), (B29c), and (B29d) around the steady-state equilibrium
yields: 0BBBB@
dk^t=dt
da^t=dt
dc^t=dt
dst=dt
1CCCCA =
0BBBB@
b11 b12 b13 b14
b21 b22 b23 b24
b31 b32 b33 b34
b41 b42 b43 b44
1CCCCA
0BBBB@
k^t   k^
a^t   a^
c^t   c^
st   s
1CCCCA+
0BBBB@
b15
b25
b35
b45
1CCCCA dK , (B30)
where
b11 =
@(dk^t=dt)
@k^t
; b12 =
@(dk^t=dt)
@a^t
; b13 =
@(dk^t=dt)
@c^t
; b14 =
@(dk^t=dt)
@st
; b15 =
@(dk^t=dt)
@K
;
b21 =
@(da^t=dt)
@k^t
; b22 =
@(da^t=dt)
@a^t
; b23 =
@(da^t=dt)
@c^t
; b24 =
@(da^t=dt)
@st
; b25 =
@(da^t=dt)
@K
;
b31 =
@(dc^t=dt)
@k^t
; b32 =
@(dc^t=dt)
@a^t
; b33 =
@(dc^t=dt)
@c^t
; b34 =
@(dc^t=dt)
@st
; b35 =
@(dc^t=dt)
@K
;
b41 =
@(dst=dt)
@k^t
; b42 =
@(dst=dt)
@a^t
; b43 =
@(dst=dt)
@c^t
; b44 =
@(dst=dt)
@st
; b45 =
@(dst=dt)
@K
:
Due to the complicated calculations, we do not list the analytical results for bij; where
i 2 f1; 2; 3; 4; 5g and j 2 f1; 2; 3; 4; 5g:
Let `1, `2, `3, and `4 be the four characteristic roots of the dynamic system. Due to
the complexity involved in calculating the four characteristic roots, we do not try to prove
the saddle-point stability analytically. Instead, via a numerical simulation, we show that
34
the dynamic system has two positive and two negative characteristic roots. For expository
convenience, in what follows let `1 and `2 be the negative root, and `3 and `4 be the positive
roots. The general solution is given by:0BBBB@
k^t
a^t
c^t
st
1CCCCA =
0BBBB@
k^(K)
a^(K)
c^(K)
s(K)
1CCCCA+
0BBBB@
1 1 1 1
h21 h22 h23 h24
h31 h32 h33 h34
h41 h42 h43 h44
1CCCCA
0BBBB@
D1e
`1t
D2e
`2t
D3e
`3t
D4e
`4t
1CCCCA : (B31a)
where D1; D2, D3, and D4 are undetermined coe¢cients and
4j =

b12 b13 b14
b22   `j b23 b24
b32 b33   `j b34
 ; j 2 f1; 2; 3; 4g; (B31b)
h2j =

`j   b11 b13 b14
 b21 b23 b24
 b31 b33   `j b34
 =4j ; j 2 f1; 2; 3; 4g; (B31c)
h3j =

b12  b11 b14
b22   `j  b21 b24
b32  b31 b34
 =4j ; j 2 f1; 2; 3; 4g; (B31d)
h4j =

b12 b13 `j   b11
b22   `j b23  b21
b32 b33   `j  b31
 =4j ; j 2 f1; 2; 3; 4g: (B31e)
The government changes the capital tax rate K from K0 to K1 at t=0. Based on eqs.
(B31a)-(B31e), we employ the following equations to describe the dynamic adjustment of k^t,
a^t, c^t and st:
35
k^t =
(
k^(K0);
k^(K1) +D1e
`1t +D2e
`2t +D3e
`3t +D4e
`4t;
t = 0 
t  0+
(B32a)
a^t =
(
a^(K0);
a^(K1) + h21D1e
`1t + h22D2e
`2t + h23D3e
`3t + h24D4e
`4t;
t = 0 
t  0+
(B32b)
c^t =
(
c^(K0);
c^(K1) + h31D1e
`1t + h32D2e
`2t + h33D3e
`3t + h34D4e
`4t;
t = 0 
t  0+
(B32c)
st =
(
s(K0);
s(K1) + h41D1e
`1t + h42D2e
`2t + h43D3e
`3t + h44D4e
`4t;
t = 0 
t  0+
(B32d)
where 0  and 0+ denote the instant before and instant after the policy implementation,
respectively. The values for D1; D2; D3 and D4 are determined by:
k^0  = k^0+ ; (B33a)
a^0  = a^0+ ; (B33b)
D3 = D4 = 0: (B33c)
Equations (B33a) and (B33b) indicate that both k^t (=
Kt
Nt
) and a^t (=
At
N
=(1 )
t
) remain
intact at the instant of policy implementation since Kt, At, and Nt are predetermined vari-
ables. Equation (B33c) is the stability condition which ensures that all k^t, a^t, c^t and st
converge to their new steady-state equilibrium. By using eqs. (B33a) and (B33b), we can
obtain:
D1 =
[k^(K0)  k^(K1)]h22   [a^(K0)  a^(K1)]
h22   h21
; (B34a)
D2 =
[a^(K0)  a^(K1)]  [k^(K0)  k^(K1)]h21
h22   h21
: (B34b)
Inserting eqs. (B33c), (B34a), and (B34b) into eqs. (B32a)-(B32d) yields:
36
k^t =
8>><
>>:
k^(K0);
k^(K1) +
[k^(K0) k^(K1)]h22 [a^(K0) a^(K1)]
h22 h21
e`1t
+ [a^(K0) a^(K1)] [k^(K0) k^(K1)]h21
h22 h21
e`2t;
t = 0 
t  0+
a^t =
8>><
>>:
a^(K0);
a^(K1) +
f[k^(K0) k^(K1)]h22 [a^(K0) a^(K1)]gh21e
`1t
h22 h21
+ f[a^(K0) a^(K1)] [k^(K0) k^(K1)]h21gh22e
`2t
h22 h21
;
t = 0 
t  0+
c^t =
8>><
>>:
c^(K0);
c^(K1) +
f[k^(K0) k^(K1)]h22 [a^(K0) a^(K1)]gh31e
`1t
h22 h21
+ f[a^(K0) a^(K1)] [k^(K0) k^(K1)]h21gh32e
`2t
h22 h21
;
t = 0 
t  0+
st =
8>><
>>:
s(K0);
s(K1) +
f[k^(K0) k^(K1)]h22 [a^(K0) a^(K1)]gh41e
`1t
h22 h21
+ f[a^(K0) a^(K1)] [k^(K0) k^(K1)]h21gh42e
`2t
h22 h21
;
t = 0 
t  0+
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Appendix C. Proof of comparative statics
From eqs. (B29a)-(B29d), we have:
dk^t=dt
k^t
= (1  )(a^t)
1= (
lY;t
k^t
)1   
c^t
k^t
     gY ; (C1a)
da^t=dt
a^t
=
&
1 +  
[lt(k^t; a^t; c^t; lY;t; K)  lY;t]

a^1 t
  gA; (C1b)
dc^t=dt
c^t
= (1  K)


(a^t)
1= (
lY;t
k^t
)1          gY ; (C1c)
dst=dt
st
= f   [
(   1)(1 +  )(1  st)
(1  )st
   ](gA + ga^;t) + ga^;t + gA   [1 +
1    
 + lt=(1  lt)
]
[(1=  )ga^;t + gk^;t   gc^;t]g=f1  + 
st
1  st
+
1    
 + lt=(1  lt)
( +
L;t
1  L;t
)
st
1  st
g:
(C1d)
In the steady state dk^t=dt
k^t
= da^t=dt
a^t
= dc^t=dt
c^t
= dst=dt
st
= 0; we then have the following steady-
state results:
c^
k^
= (1  )(a^)1= [
(1  s)l
k^
]1       gY ; (C1e)
gA =
&
1 +  
(sl)
a^1 
; (C1f)
 = (1  K)


(a^)1= [
(1  s)l
k^
]1       gY ; (C1g)
0 =    [
(   1)(1 +  )(1  s)
(1  )s
   ]gA + gA: (C1h)
Based on eq. (C1h), we have:
s =
 1


1 
(1+ )gA
 +

1 +  1


1 

(1+ )gA
: (C2)
From eqs. (B3) and (C1g), we can obtain
r   gY =  > 0: (C3)
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Equation eq. (C1g) can be rearranged as:
y^=k^ = (a^)1= [
(1  s)l
k^
]1  =
( +  + gY )
(1  K)
: (C4a)
Substituting eq. (C4a) into eq. (C1e) gives rise to:
c^
y^
= f(1  )
( +  + gY )
(1  K)
     gY g
k^
y^
= (1  )  ( + gY )
(1  K)
( +  + gY )
: (C5a)
To ensure that the steady-state consumption-output ratio c^=y^ is positive, we impose the
restriction (1  )  ( + gY )
(1 K)
(++gY )
> 0 for all values of the time preference rate . As a
consequence, lim!0 c^=y^>0 implies:
(1  ) 
(1  K)

> 0: (C5b)
From eq (C1f), we can derive:
a^ = [
&
(1 +  )gA
]1=(1 )(sl)=(1 ): (C6)
Based on eq. (B28), we can infer the following expression:
L = (1  s)
   

K
1  
; (C7a)
where
@L
@K
=  (1  s)


1  
< 0: (C7b)
Equipped with eqs. (B1), (B2), (B5), and LY = N(1  s)l, we can obtain:
l
1  l
 =
y^
c^
(1  L)(1  )
(1  s)
: (C8)
Inserting eqs. (C5a) and (C7a) into eq. (C8) yields:
l =
8><
>:
1  
+ 1
[(1 ) (+gY )
(1 K )
(++gY )
]
(1 L)(1 )
(1 s)
;  > 0
1 ;  = 0
; (C9a)
where
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@l
@K
=
8<
:
( 1 s
1 
)[1 +  1

(+gY )
+(1+ )gA
](1 l)l
(++gY )(1 L)[1  (+gY )
(1 K )
(++gY )
]
> 0 ;  > 0
0 ;  = 0
: (C9b)
Combining eqs. (C2), (C6), and (C9b) together, we can derive
a^ = [
&
(1 +  )gA
]1=(1 )(sl)=(1 ); (C10a)
where
@a^
@K
=

(1  )
a^
@l
l@K
> 0: (C10b)
Based on eqs. (C4a), (C9b), (B12), and (B18), we have:
y^ = a^
1= 
1  [
(1  K)
( +  + gY )
]

1  (1  s)l; (C11a)
where
@y^
@K
= [
@l
l@K
 

(1  )(1  K)
]y^
>
<
0;   1 +
1=  
1  

1  
: (C11b)
According to eqs. (C4a), (C5a), and (C11b), we obtain:
k^ =
(1  K)
( +  + gY )
y^; (C12a)
c^ = [(1  )  ( + gY )
(1  K)
( +  + gY )
]y^; (C12b)
Inserting eq. (C11a) into (C12a) and (C12b), we can derive the following comparative statics:
@k^
@K
=
(1  K)y^
( +  + gY )
f
@l
l@K
 
1
(1  )(1  K)
g
>
<
0; (C12c)
@c^
@K
= f
( + gY )
( +  + gY )
+ [(1  )
 
(1  K)( + gY )
( +  + gY )
][
@l
l@K
 

(1  )(1  K)
]gy^
>
<
0:
(C12d)
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